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Abstract. It is commonplace for philosophers to distinguish mere truths from
truths that perspicuously represent the world’s structure. According to a pop-
ular view, the perspicuous truths are supposed to be metaphysically revelatory
and to play an important role in the accounts of law-hood, confirmation, and
linguistic interpretation. Yet, there is no consensus about how to characterize
this distinction. I examine strategies developed by Lewis and by Sider in his
Writing the Book of the World which purport to explain this distinction in
terms of vocabulary: the truths that represent the world perspicuously have
better, joint-carving vocabulary. I argue that the distinction between a per-
spicuous and mere truth concerns both the vocabulary of the sentence and its
grammar. I then show that the collective motivations for distinguishing per-
spicuous from mere truths do not allow them to properly impose constraints
on grammar.
Philosophers are accustomed to thinking of the logical structure of the world as
mirrored in language. On this view, reality has some intrinsic structure. Our sen-
tences are meant to represent this structure. Those taken by this idea—especially
in the analytic tradition—often find logical imperfections in the language we ac-
tually use. This language arose from our practical needs as much as our desire to
represent the structure of the world. One task of philosophy is to rephrase our
untidy but true sentences into a logically perfect notation that corresponds to the
objective structure of the world. As Wisdom (1933: 195) once said, in substituting
one sentence by another, the philosopher “gives insight into Structure.” In outline,
this is the basic picture of a recent trend in metaphysics. I take as a core instance
Sider’s Writing the Book of the World : reality has an intrinsic structure. Equiva-
lently, it has a privileged description.1 Philosophy – and inquiry generally – aims
at finding this privileged description.
1Sider (2012: vii): “The world has a distinguished structure, a privileged description.”
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But what privileges the sentences of this description? According to Sider, these
sentences are privileged not only because they are true, but because their vocab-
ulary is metaphysically privileged. This vocabulary carves nature at the joints
rather than cutting it into arbitrary bits. Carving at the joints is not a property
an expression has in virtue of its linguistic or psychological profile, but in virtue of
corresponding to a worldly element that is elite or fundamental.2 A language whose
sentences are composed only of joint-carving vocabulary is a structural language.
A truth of this language is a structural truth.3 The set of structural truths gives a
complete and privileged description of the world.4
Sider suggests that world has a privileged description in order to solve puzzles
that arise from deviant descriptions. Consider theories expressed using the predi-
cates ‘is grue’ and ‘is bleen’, introduced in Goodman (1983b). These predicates are
governed by the following axiom schemata.5
Grue: pα is grueq is true if and only if α is green and observed before time t
or is blue and unobserved before time t.
Bleen: pα is bleenq is true if and only if α is green and observed before time
t or is blue and unobserved before time t
These expressions are strange. It is unnatural to characterize emeralds and frogs as
grue in addition to characterizing them as green. It offers a strange metaphysics. It
2Sider (2012: 12, 221-2) repeatedly characterizes this relation as correspondence.
3I take the following passages as evidence that Sider is committed to this characterization of
structural truth.
• [A] fact is fundamental when it is stated in joint-carving terms. (Sider 2012: iv)
• [I]n a fundamental language, all and only primitive expressions carve at the joints. Thus
p=(α)q will be true iff α is a primitive expression. (Sider 2012: 92, footnote 14. ‘=(...)’
is Sider’s regimentation of ‘is fundamental’.)
• A fundamental truth is a truth involving only fundamental terms. (Sider 2012: 128)
• Call a sentence structural iff each of its words carve at the joints. [...] And call a
[sentence] a structural truth iff it is true and structural. [...] Suppose...that it is a
fundamental truth that there are electrons. For me, this boils down to the fact that i)
there are indeed electrons; and ii) electron-hood and existential quantification carve at
the joints. (Sider 2012: 147)
• [A] structural truth is just a true sentence composed of only joint-carving expressions[.]
(Sider 2012: 148)
4Sider explains what he means by completeness in §7.1.
5Note that each of these is an axiom schema that describe more specific instances. Thus, there is
no use-mention confusion. If one were to attempt to express these axiom schemata as generalities,
one would need to talk about the referent of pαq.
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is as though grue things constitute some important class alongside the green things.
Although I will not discuss the issues in any detail, these predicates are also no-
toriously ill-behaved for the purposes of formulating laws, offering explanations,
confirmation, and linguistic interpretation. Indeed, Sider (2012: §1.2) takes theo-
ries formulated using ‘is grue’ and ‘is bleen’ as paradigms of deviant descriptions,
but is also quick to observe that similar problems can be raised by non-predicate ex-
pressions such as deviant proper names, temporal or modal operators, or quantifiers
(2012: viii, §6.1).
Sider explains the strangeness of these descriptions in terms of structural truth.
In his view, structural truth is a constitutive aim of inquiry.
Achieving the goal of inquiry requires that one’s belief state reflect
the world, which in addition to lack of error requires one to think
of the world in its terms, to carve the world at its joints. Wielders
of non-joint-carving terms are worse inquirers.6
Inquirers who taxonomize the world into grue things and bleen things simply use
the wrong terms to describe the world, regardless of whether they thereby say true
things. For this reason, the metaphysical commitments of their theories need not
be taken seriously.
As evidence for the claim that inquiry aims at structural truth, Sider observes
that our theory selection practices favor theories that deploy fewer primitive pred-
icates. Sider (2012: 14) suggests that we resist theories deploying more vocabulary
than is needed because they are less economical, they posit “a fuller, more complex
world, a world with more structure”. Since inquirers have reason to prefer theories
framed in wholly joint-carving vocabulary, Sider can justify the exclusion of other
vocabulary from the standard procedures for formulating laws, offering explana-
tions, confirmation, and interpretation. As Lewis (1999b: 42) says, “[t]he remedy
[for these standard procedures] is not to tolerate such a perverse choice of primitive
vocabulary.” The speakers use the wrong terms on account of the fact that these
terms don’t correspond to elite—fundamental—elements of the world.
6Sider (2012: 61). Emphasis added. Compare (Sider 2009: 401).
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Because sentences of the form pα is grueq and pβ is bleenq are Sider’s canonical
examples of non-structural truths, his account should rule them as such. I will
argue that the account fails to do so. The illusion to the contrary is created by
artificially restricting attention to a subset of possible languages. Sider’s charac-
terization of structural truth is developed by considering languages that contain
deviant vocabulary. But I show that deviance can also result from the grammar
of the language. As a consequence, there are sentences whose semantic character-
izations are the same as those of pα is grueq and pβ is bleenq, but which result
not from any deviant vocabulary item in the sentence, but from the way the vo-
cabulary items are put together. We will see that this objection parallels others
that Sider himself offers against competing theories. I conclude with a discussion
of how this problem arises out of Sider’s core commitments. The difficulties I raise
for Sider parallel difficulties faced by the logical atomists, who also thought that
the structure of the world was to be represented by the selection of a language. My
argument seeks to show that we have yet to fully confront these problems.
1. Tightening the Account
According to Sider, a sentence is a structural truth just in case it is true and each
primitive vocabulary item composing it corresponds to a fundamental ingredient
of the world. Structural truth is characterized in terms of fundamentality and
correspondence. So we must have some account of these in order to understand
the characterization. Sider takes the notion of fundamentality as primitive.7 It
can be characterized but not analyzed. It is regimented with an operator, ‘=(...)’.
I presuppose only that structural truth can be characterized as a truth whose
worldly correspondents are fundamental. Thus, my argument will apply to those
sympathetic to Sider, but who offer a more robust analysis of fundamentality.
Sider is more reticent about what is required for a vocabulary item to correspond
to “something real” (Sider 2012: 12). But he is clear that joint-carving vocabulary
item must correspond to something in the world:
7Chapter 2 of Sider (2012) is devoted to this thesis.
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[I]t would be a mistake to think of structure as concerning linguistic
items. The fact [...] that ‘is negatively charged’ carves at the joints
isn’t in the first instance a fact about the predicate ‘is negatively
charged’. The fact is simply a fact about the concrete, nonlinguistic
world—about its “charge aspect”, so to speak.8
Given this, one would expect Sider to hold that every expression corresponds to
some entity. It is surprising, then, that Sider resists this conclusion. How are these
positions compatible?
To specify the worldly correlate of an expression, Sider simply re-uses it. For
concreteness, consider a simpler description of a simpler world, that of The Muppet
Show. A description of this world is expressed in a language that contains names for
the muppets such as ‘Kermit’, ‘Bunsen’, ‘Gonzo’, and so on. The language contains
predicates such as ‘is green’, ‘is blue’, and so on. It contains sentential connectives
such as ‘not’, ‘and’, and ‘or’. Finally, it contains quantifiers ‘there is’ and ‘for all’.
The description of this world includes subject-predicate (S-P) sentences (1)-(3).
Each sentence concatenates a name with a predicate.
S-P Description: (1) Kermit is green. (2) Bunsen is green.9 (3) Gonzo is
blue.
Since sentence (1) is a structural truth, the primitive expressions ‘Kermit’ and ‘is
green’ are joint-carving and must correspond to fundamental elements.
Sider would specify these fundamental elements as follows: ‘Kermit’ corresponds
to Kermit and ‘is green’ to is green.10 While Kermit may be an entity, Sider
would argue that is green is not. Thus, the worldly correlates of some expressions
are not entities. Sider calls these notions to smooth over his discussion. The
worldly correlates of expressions from other syntactic categories can also be given
by disquoting. Thus, the expressions ‘not’, ‘and’, ‘or’, and ‘there is’ correspond
8(Sider 2012: 147).
9Some find this claim to be controversial.
10(Sider 2012: §6.3).
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to notions not, and, or, and there is, respectively. None of these expressions will
correspond to an entity.11
2. The world is not a list of entities
Alternative entity-based views characterize the privileged description by positing
a number of elite entities. Terms for elite entities provide the resources to completely
describe reality. As Lewis (1999b: 12) says,
A satisfactory inventory of [the elite entities] is a non-linguistic
counterpart of a primitive vocabulary for a language capable of
describing the world exhaustively.
Sider objects on precisely this point. The elite entities do not determine a language
capable of describing the world completely. In completely describing the world, one
inevitably uses some expressions or representational devices that do not correspond
to entities. These expressions and representational devices can involve themselves
in the kinds of mischief that expressions such as ‘is grue’ and ‘is bleen’ do. Thus,
Sider concludes that our metaphysics must include elite non-entities which are the
worldly correspondents of privileged syncategorematic expressions.
Does the proponent of the entity-based approach have resources to resist this
argument? According to such views, the structure of the world—and thus the lan-
guage capable of formulating a complete and privileged description—is determined
by a list of elite entities. These might be natural properties, sparse universals, truth-
makers, or fundamental entities.12 How can a mere list of elite entities determine
a privileged and exhaustive description?
It is clear that one cannot completely describe the world merely by naming the
elite entities. A description is comprised of sentences, not of names. One must
combine the names with syncategorematic expressions to form sentences. The goal
11Sider will need to further characterize the relation of “correspondence”. This requires addressing
the paradox of the concept of horse discussed in Frege (1951), Wiggins (1984), and Wright (2004). I
suspect that Sider would say either that correspondence, like fundamentality, can be meaningfully
concatenated with expressions of different syntactic types, or that the notion of correspondence
should be stratified.
12See Lewis (1999b) on natural properties; Armstrong (1980a,b) on sparse universals; Armstrong
(1997) on states of affairs and truth-makers; and Schaffer (2009) on fundamental entities.
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is to formulate a description that characterizes the world completely, but at the
same time excludes misbehaved truths such as those containing ‘is grue’ and ‘is
bleen’. One might argue that a complete and privileged description of the world
must name—and perhaps assert the existence of—every entity, and nothing else.
The world as described by a list of elite entities: A theory is a privi-
leged description of reality just in case it (i) is true; (ii) contains names for
elite entities only; (iii) asserts the existence of such entities (and perhaps
that they are fundamental); and (iv) asserts nothing else.
Sider (2012: §§8.5-8.6) interprets certain versions of truth-maker theory along these
lines: a maximal and true theory satisfying (i)-(iv) is a complete description of
reality. On his reading of these views, the whole nature of reality is “explained” by
the existence of certain fundamental entities.
The characterization of a privileged description excludes predicates such as ‘is
grue’ from the description. But, it does so by excluding all predicates from the
description. A complete description of reality must say not only which entities
there are, but also—in the vocabulary of Lewis (1999a: 206)—how they are. How
can a mere list of the entities that exist—such as Kermit, Gonzo, Bunsen, and so
on—account for the fact that Kermit is green? Crucial information is lost from our
description of the world.13
Sider (2012: §§7.3,8.5) considers one possible response. The proponent of the
entity-based approach might respond by introducing syntactically complex singu-
lar terms—such as ‘the fact that Kermit is green’, ‘Kermit’s greenness’, or simply
‘green Kermit’—and argue that the existence claims involving these expressions
completely describe the world. The obvious worry, however, is that we must dis-
criminate the privileged complex singular terms from the unprivileged ones. Thus,
13Sider (2012: 96) reads Armstrong as holding that the metaphysical complexity of a theory is
given by the particulars and universals that it posits and concludes: “although ‘instantiates’ is
an ineliminable part of his ideology, he cannot recognize ‘instantiates’ as fundamental, in the
way that he recognizes fundamental physical predicates as fundamental. But claims specifying
which particulars instantiate which universals are clearly part of Armstrong’s fundamental theory
of the world. Merely to list the universals and particulars, without specifying which particulars
instantiate which universals, would be a woefully partial description of what, according to him,
the world is fundamentally like.”
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‘green Kermit’ is a good complex singular term, but ‘grue Kermit’ is not, even
though these two expressions might denote the same individual, Kermit, who is
both green and grue. To discriminate the privileged complex singular terms from
the others, we must seemingly discriminate between the syncategorematic expres-
sions that figure into them.
More importantly, the description already contains sentences composed of both
names and syncategorematic expressions such as ‘exists’ and ‘is fundamental’. Sider
complains, rightly, that these non-names are subject to deviant alternatives. For
instance, he (2012: 96) points to recent debates over quantifier variance, the pos-
sibility of multiple quantifiers differing from each other just as ‘grue’ differs from
‘blue’. In Sider’s view, we ought to prefer some of these quantifiers to others, and
the reason for this preference ought to be grounded in a metaphysical difference
between the privileged, joint-carving quantifier and the other deviant ones. Once
again, the proponent of the entity-based view must offer some metaphysical ground
distinguishing the syncategorematic expressions that are admissible into our privi-
leged description of the world from those that are deviant.
2.1. TheWorldly Correspondents of Syncategorematic Expressions. Arm-
strong (1980a,b) and Lewis (1999b) purport to provide the ground to distinguish
privileged syncategorematic expressions from ordinary ones, at least in the case of
predicates. As Sider understands them, every predicate used to express a privileged
description of the world must correspond to some elite entity, characterized using a
nominalization of that predicate. Thus, they think of simple predicates in an ideal
theory as contributing entities of a special sort: sparse universals for Armstrong
and natural properties for Lewis. On this sort of view, non-names make their way
into the privileged description. A predicate such as ‘is green’ can be included,
provided that it corresponds to a universal or natural property. Unwelcome predi-
cates such as ‘is grue’ can be excluded, provided that they fail to correspond to a
universal or natural property.
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Sider (2012: §6.1) complains that the focus on predicates is too narrow, since
expressions of any syntactic category can give rise to strangeness and misbehavior
of the sort exemplified by ‘grue’ and ‘bleen’. For this reason, Sider prefers his
view that there is a range of elite or fundamental non-entities, and in a completely
successful theory, every expression—not just every predicate—corresponds to one
of these elite non-entities.14
Still, there is an obvious solution which does not require endorsing Sider’s no-
entity view. Perhaps every expression purports to correspond to an elite entity,
whether or not that entity is an individual, a property, an operator meaning, or
what have you. Spelling this view out a bit:
Vocabulary and Elite Entities: A theory is a privileged description of re-
ality just in case (i*) it is true and (ii*) every expression used to express
the theory corresponds to a privileged entity.
On such a view, a maximal description satisfying (i*) and (ii*) is a complete de-
scription of reality. For instance, Bealer (1982) posits entities that correspond to
expressions of every syntactic type in our language. Bealer refers to these enti-
ties using nominalizations. Thus, ‘and’ corresponds to conjunction and ‘there are’
corresponds to existence or the second-level property of having an instance. Ex-
pressions of any syntactic category may correspond to elite or to ordinary entities.15
A metaphysics of this sort seems to satisfy Sider’s demand that an inventory of the
elite entities provides the resources to completely describe the world.
Sider offers two arguments against views of this sort. One sort of argument
appeals to his distaste for these types of entities: “the treatment of quantifiers
as denoting second-order properties or relations, however appropriate in linguistic
theory, does not ring true at a metaphysical level” (Sider 2012: 90). I find this sort
of argument less compelling. We are considering metaphysical approaches to the
14Sider cites other advantages to characterizing the privileged description in terms of non-entities
rather than entities: his framework is more neutral (§6.0) and debates over whether something
exists don’t seem like debates about whether a property has a second-level property (§6.3).
15The mere fact that every expression in a sentence corresponds to an elite entity does not, for
Bealer, entail that the sentence is structural, or—as he would say—expresses a condition. Thus,
Bealer is a propositionalist, discussed in §5.
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problem of deviant descriptions. Any such approach, including Sider’s own, will be
metaphysically committed. It is by no means obvious in this point of the dialectic
that the entity-based approach will have more elements that fail to “ring true” than
Sider’s own.
Fortunately, Sider has a more compelling argument. Thus far, his position has
been to suggest that entity-based approaches leave something out. Now, Sider
(2012: 90, footnote 8) argues that any such description of the world will still re-
quire a representational device—the syntactic relation of concatenation—that cor-
responds to no entity.
[O]ne can treat all expressions as standing for entities [...] although
then there is a meaningful syntactic operation—concatenation—
that stands for no entity.
The basic expressions of a sentence such as ‘Kermit is green’ might correspond to
elite entities while the grammar of the sentence is interpreted freely.16
Consider a language which has the same vocabulary as the language of the S-P
description given above. In this language, ‘Kermit’ corresponds to Kermit and ‘is
green’ to the property of being green. In the original S-P description—as understood
by the entity-based views—sentences are formed by concatenating a subject pαq
with a predicate pis Fq to yield pα is Fq. Sentences of this form are governed by
the following axiom schema.
Concatenation in the S-P language: pα is Fq is true if and only if α
has the property corresponding to pis Fq.
The alternate language is not a subject-predicate language, but a predicate-subject
(P-S) language. From a name α and a singular term pis Fq, one can form the
sentence pis F(α)q. (I add parentheses for legibility.) Predicate-subject sentences
in the P-S language have the following truth conditions.
16Recent discussion of related issues can be found in Davidson (2005), MacBride (2006), and
Magidor (2009).
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Concatenation in the P-S language: pis F(α)q is true if and only if α
has the property corresponding to pis Fq and is observed before t or is blue
and is unobserved before t.
As a result of this interpretation of the truth conditions of sentences of the P-S
language, the sentence ‘is green(Kermit)’ has the same truth conditions as ‘Kermit
is grue’ and is liable to cause the same mischief. Therefore, it cannot be counted
as a structural truth. But the entity-based approach has no way of ruling out the
sentences of languages whose concatenation relation has such a deviant interpreta-
tion. As formulated, the view entails that such a language is privileged, since every
expression stands for a privileged entity.
The P-S language illustrates that grammatical features can have truth condi-
tional effects so that a sentence composed of structural vocabulary can nonetheless
be deviant. Admittedly, the deviance is rather coarse insofar as it affects the truth
conditions of every sentence in the language. By way of contrast, Goodman’s pred-
icates ‘grue’ and ‘bleen’ introduce deviance only for particular sentences. But once
the possibility of a deviant grammar has been introduced, it is easy to construct
subtler deviant grammatical relations. For instance, one can specify a language
so that sentences of the form pis green(α)q and pis blue(α)q have the same truth
conditions as pα is grueq and pβ is bleenq, respectively, but the truth conditions of
every other sentence remain the same.
Subtler P-S language: pis F(α)q is true if and only if
• α has the property corresponding to pis Fq and pis Fq corresponds to
neither the property of being blue nor the property of being green, or
• α has the property corresponding to pis Fq and is observed before t
or is green and is unobserved before t and pis Fq corresponds to the
property of being blue, or
• α has the property corresponding to pis Fq and is observed before t
or is blue and is unobserved before t and pis Fq corresponds to the
property of being green.
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In what follows, I will restrict my attention to the coarser kind of deviant language
for simplicity. But everything could be reframed in terms of the subtler sort of
deviance introduced above.
2.2. Is the P-S Language Possible? The question arises: why am I entitled to
assume that the expressions ‘Kermit’ and ‘is green’ in the P-S language continue
to correspond to the same things in the S-P and P-S languages? Let me first
note that Sider and his opponents are considering languages characterized rather
abstractly. So there is simply no question whether or not there is a language
satisfying the characterization.17 There remains an interesting question of whether
such a language can be spoken by some possible community. If a language so
characterized is in principle unspeakable, then the proponent of the entity-based
view could appeal to this fact to account for its strangeness, rather than to anything
metaphysical.
I believe that this language is possible. Imagine that it arises out of the S-P
language as follows.
Stage 1: The inquirers continue to assert S-P sentences such as ‘Kermit is
green’, but begin asserting predicate-subject (P-S) sentences such as ‘is
green(Kermit)’, introduced by the stipulation: a sentence of the form pis
green(α)q is true if and only if the referent of pαq is green and observed
before time t or is blue and unobserved before time t. Corresponding stip-
ulations are made for the other predicates of the language.
Stage 2: The inquirers regard ‘is green’ as having the same semantic function
in ‘Kermit is green’ and in ‘is green(Kermit)’. This is witnessed by their
willingness to use these in coordination and ellipsis. Thus, they assert both
‘Kermit is green. Bunsen is too’ and ‘Kermit is green. Is too(Gonzo)’. The
sentences of the latter sequence are true on account of the fact that Kermit
is green and Gonzo is unobserved before t.
Stage 3: The inquirers abandon the S-P construction, leaving only the P-S
construction.
Charity would suggest that we should interpret the vocabulary of the language as
unchanged. I will consider this issue in more depth in §4.1.
17Thanks to Richard Woodward for emphasizing this point.
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2.3. Privileged Concatenation. A proponent of entity-based views could reply
that there must also be a privileged entity—the privileged instantiation relation—to
which the concatenation relation in a privileged language must correspond. Accord-
ing to this response, the concatenation relation of the sentences of the P-S language
fails to correspond to such a relation. Thus, ‘is green(Kermit)’ is not a structural
truth.
Unfortunately, a response of this sort faces well-known difficulties. The fact that
the names of a privileged language must correspond to privileged individuals, the
predicates must correspond to privileged properties, and the concatenation relation
must correspond to the privileged instantiation relation still fails to pin down the
truth conditions of a sentence that concatenates a name with a predicate. One
must additionally say that a sentence that S-P concatenates a name pαq with a
predicate pis Fq is true just in case that privileged instantiation relation actually
relates the individual corresponding to the name with the property corresponding to
the predicate. We could represent this condition as Instantiation(α, the property
of being F ). It would follow that the truth conditions for pα is Fq could be given
as follows.
Instantiation: pα is Fq is true if and only if Instantiation(α, the property
of being F ).
Unfortunately, the requirement that the concatenation relation of a language cor-
responds to a fundamental entity can be satisfied by deviant languages. For in-
stance: a sentence pis F (α)q is true just in case α either is actually related by the
instantiation relation (designated by the concatenation relation) to the property
corresponding to pis Fq and is observed before t or is blue and unobserved before
t. We could represent this latter relation between α, the property of being F , and
Instantiation by a slight syntactic rearrangement: (α, being F )Instantiation.
Backwards-Instantiation: pis F(α)q is true if and only if (α, the property
of being F )Instantiation.
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A proponent of the entity-approach could rule out this interpretation by privileging
a relation relates instantiation to α and the property of being F in the right way.
Call this the actually relating relation. Yet, this merely spins us around once again
without having caught our tail. The same problem of specifying the truth conditions
of a sentence in terms of these four items—Kermit, the property of being green,
instantiation, and the relation of actually relating—recurs once again. We therefore
seem to require a representational device that does not to designate an entity.
A subtle maneuver at this point would be to say something of greater depth about
the notion of correspondence, and in particular what it is for a syntactic relation
to correspond to an element in reality. I have been presupposing very little about
correspondence: mainly that correspondence is a relationship between aspects of
language and aspects of the world. One might attempt to offer a functional defini-
tion of what it is for the concatenation relation to denote another relation. There
are ways of implementing such a functional definition which would require the de-
notation of the concatenation relation to relate the dentation of the subject to the
denotation of an object in a certain way. For instance, one might say that the
denotation of the concatenation relation is constrained by the following.
Correspondence: The concatenation relation R uniting the sentence pα
is Fq corresponds to the relation R∗ only if pα is Fq is true if and only if
R∗(α, the property of being F ).
On this account, the truth conditions I articulated as Backwards-Instantiation
would be impossible.
But the maneuver privileges one interpretation of concatenation over others with-
out providing any reason to do so. That is, we might ask, why the concatenation
relation must be interpreted as relating the α to the property of being F in desired
way. What prohibits an interpretation schema such as the following?
Backwards-Correspondence: The concatenation relation R uniting the
sentence pα is Fq corresponds to the relation R∗ only if pα is Fq is true if
and only if (α, the property of being F )R∗.
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On natural answer is that there is something more natural meant by the concate-
nation relation in sentences of the form pR∗(α, the property of being F )q than in
sentences of the form p(α, the property of being F )R∗q. But this merely iterates
the problem again.
In the dialectical context, this seems like special pleading. Let’s move back a
step. Consider the initial claim that if we interpret a predicate as standing for
an entity, then the truth conditions of a sentence must make use of an additional
syncategorematic term such as ‘instantiates’ to link the denotation of a subject with
the denotation of the predicate. A corresponding move could build this relationship
into what it means for a predicate to correspond to a property. That is, we might
impose the following requirement on a predicate corresponding to a property:
Predicate Correspondence: The worldly correspondent of a predicate
pis Fq is property P only if pα is Fq is true if and only if Instantiates(α,
P ).
This account would effectively build the semantic function of the relevant syntactic
relation into the condition a property has to meet to be the worldly correspondent
of a predicate. But we have been assuming that it is reasonable to ask why a
sentence must be interpreted in a certain way, even assuming that its subject and
predicate are interpreted to correspond to a given object and property, respectively.
I see no reason why the same worry shouldn’t now apply in the interpretation of
the concatenation relation.
2.4. Saying and Showing. Sider does offer a poisoned pawn to his opponents
who insist on specifying the worldly correlates of their expressions as entities. Per-
haps, Sider suggests, the proponent of an entity-based metaphysics could make use
of Wittgenstein’s (1921/2001) distinction between saying and showing. On such a
view, the resources used to characterize the connections among the various funda-
mental ingredients of our metaphysics cannot be isolated out. They will be shown
by the choice of whole sentences in our language. But there is nothing said in our
preferred theory that distinguishes these sentences from other sentences with other
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structures that one might speak. Sider (2012: 96) suggests that such a position is
mysterious:
[One] might, in Wittgensteinian fashion, reply that one cannot say
the whole truth about fundamentality. The whole truth can only
be shown, by quantifying over entities, saying that particulars in-
stantiate universals, and so on. If this position is uncomfortable,
that is a reason to reject [entity-based metaphysics] and to adopt
a broader conception of metaphysical commitment.
In the remainder of this paper, I will show that Sider’s admirable commitment to
clarity leads him into trouble.
3. The world is not a list of non-entities.
The argument against the entity-based view purported to show that a sentence
could be deviant even if all of the expressions it contains correspond to elite entities.
In particular, it does not follow merely from the fact that ‘Kermit’ corresponds to
Kermit and ‘is green’ corresponds to the property of being green, that the truth
conditions of the sentence ‘Kermit is green’ are as follows.
Truth Conditions: ‘Kermit is green’ is true if and only if Kermit instan-
tiates the property of being green.
The reason is that we can have a sentence with the exact same vocabulary, but
with clearly deviant truth conditions.
Deviant Truth Conditions: ‘Is green(Kermit)’ is true if and only if
Kermit instantiates the property of being green and is observed before t or
is blue and is unobserved before t.
‘Is green(Kermit)’ has the same vocabulary as ‘Kermit is green’ but has a different
grammar. The grammar makes a truth conditional contribution that cannot be
assessed at the level of vocabulary. The example of ‘is green(Kermit)’ shows that
a sentence can be deviant even though all of its vocabulary is privileged. The
deviance here is most plausibly attributed to grammar.
Recall that on Sider’s view whether a sentence is deviant or structural is deter-
mined entirely by the vocabulary that composes it: “a structural truth is just a
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true sentence composed of only joint-carving expressions” (Sider 2012: 148). In-
deed, Sider (2012: 148) cites his account’s insensitivity to grammar as a virtue. He
endorses a combinatorial principle as a consequence of his explicit characterization
of a structural truth.
Combinatorial Principle: If S is a [structural] truth, and S′ is any true
sentence containing no expressions other than those occurring in S, then
S′ is a [structural] truth.
This principle tells us that if ‘Miss Piggy loves Kermit’ is a structural truth, and
the love is requited, then ‘Kermit loves Miss Piggy’ is a structural truth as well.
This should make us nervous. Given the assumption that the sentence ‘Kermit
is green’ is a structural truth, it should follow that any true sentence containing
the same vocabulary is also structural. This presupposes that the worldly corre-
spondents of the vocabulary in a sentence exhaust the sentence’s representational
features. Equivalently, Sider presupposes that no representational features of the
sentence other than its vocabulary can exhibit misbehavior of the sort that ‘is
grue’ does. But this assumption is unwarranted in light of the criticism of the
entity-based views. These criticisms showed that the grammar of the sentence is a
representational feature. We just saw how—on the entity-based view—a sentence
such as ‘is green(Kermit)’ with non-deviant vocabulary can be deviant as a result
of the contribution of its grammar.
Superficially, it might seem that Sider’s no-entity approach avoids this problem.
In the case of an entity-based approach, the additional truth conditional contri-
bution of the grammatical relation in ‘Kermit is green’ is made explicit by the
relational predicate ‘instantiates’ in the statements of the truth conditions. Sider
does not need to deploy an additional predicate such as ‘instantiates’ to state the
truth conditions of ‘Kermit is green’. On his view, ‘Kermit’ corresponds to Ker-
mit and ‘is green’ corresponds to is green. Sider can state the truth conditions for
‘Kermit is green’ using vocabulary that deploys just these two notions:
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Truth Conditions ‘Kermit is green’ is true if and only if Kermit is green.
However, Sider’s theory merely disguises, rather than eliminates, the truth condi-
tional contribution of grammar.
In particular, the truth conditions of ‘Kermit is green’ require that the gram-
matical relationship of concatenation is interpreted as follows.
Concatenation: pα is Fq is true if and only if α is F .
But there are possible languages such as the P-S language which interpret concate-
nation differently. P-S concatenation as it occurs in ‘is green(Kermit)’ is interpreted
as follows.
Deviant Concatenation: pis F(α)q is true if and only if α is F and is
observed before t or is blue and is unobserved before t.
It follows form this that ‘is green(Kermit)’ has deviant truth conditions. It is true if
and only if Kermit is grue. But its vocabulary, ‘Kermit’ and ‘is green’, correspond
to fundamental notions only: Kermit and is green. So Sider’s account wrongly rules
that ‘is green(Kermit)’ is a structural truth as well.
This reveals that Sider’s argument does not target the entity-based view as such.
Rather, it targets views—such as the one that Sider himself holds—which attempt
to characterize whether a sentence is structural wholly in terms of its vocabulary.
One cannot do this if one wants to hold that ‘Kermit is green’ is privileged, but
‘is green(Kermit)’ is not. Appealing only to vocabulary and not grammar will
lead either to Wittgensteinian silence as to why one sentence is structural but the
other is not or it will lead to the combinatorial principle. But the combinatorial
principle says that the if two truths have the same vocabulary, then they are both
structural. Thus, any account purporting to distinguish the structural truths from
the nonstructural truths must have something to say about grammar.18
18This section was greatly improved by suggestions from an anonymous referee from Nouˆs.
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4. Defending the P-S language
The P-S language shows that the vocabulary of a language does not exhaust
its representational complexity. I now respond to a potential objection and some
refinements that Sider might offer to save his view by ruling out the P-S language
The objection I consider holds that the sentences of the P-S language cannot have
the truth conditions specified above while their vocabulary items retain the same
meanings they have in the S-P language. The refinements of Sider’s view concern
the possibility of privileging the concatenation relation and the possibility of build-
ing grammatical rules into the vocabulary. I argue that neither the objection nor
the refinements can avoid the fundamental problem. Finally, I explore the deeper
source of the problem, a thesis that Sider labels subpropositionalism.
4.1. Interpreting vocabulary in the P-S language. I claim that it is possible
for a community to have a language in which the name ‘Kermit’ corresponds to
Kermit; the predicate ‘is green’ corresponds to is green; and the truth conditions
of the sentence ‘is green(Kermit)’ are the same as those of ‘Kermit is grue’. If
this is not possible, then Sider could account for the strangeness of the P-S de-
scription in terms of the impossibility of speaking such a language, rather than in
terms of its metaphysical content. It therefore might be tempting to respond that
these conditions are jointly incompatible. This response might make use of Sider’s
development of Lewis’s idea that combines internal or use-based constraints on
linguistic interpretation with other external constraints arising from the linguistic
environment.
The internal or use-based constraints on interpretation are not relevant. These
constraints mandate that the interpretation of a sentence should conform as far as
possible with the principle of charity. To oversimplify considerably, speakers should
be interpreted as speaking truly as far as is compatible with other constraints on
interpretation. This constraint is satisfied in the interpretation of the possible com-
munity speaking the P-S language. It is stipulated that they assert pIs green(α)q
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just in case the referent of pαq is green and observed before t or blue and unobserved
before t.
A partisan of Sider should appeal to the external constraints instead. Sider’s
(2012: §3.2) discussion is complicated, but he outlines three such constraints. First,
the vocabulary ought to be interpreted as corresponding to notions that are as
fundamental as possible. Second, the relationship between vocabulary items and
their worldly correspondents should be as natural as possible. Third, the truth
conditions of the language users’ sentences should be specified by sentences that
approximate structural truths as far as possible with every element in the statement
of the truth condition corresponding to elements in the original sentence.
The first constraint is satisfied. If we interpret ‘Kermit’ as corresponding to
Kermit and ‘is green’ to is green, then the vocabulary composing ‘is green(Kermit)’
is interpreted as corresponding to fundamental elements. The second constraint
also looks to be satisfied in the case as I described it. For, we may suppose that
‘Kermit’ and ‘is green’ in the original S-P language stand in highly natural rela-
tions to Kermit and is green, respectively. I have further stipulated that the uses of
these expressions in P-S constructions are causally linked to uses in S-P construc-
tions. The relationship between these expressions and their worldly correspondents
is, therefore, still fairly fundamental. Even if the relation is less than perfectly
fundamental, it is clearly not so gerrymandered and gruesome as to override the
stipulated use facts (such as the ellipsis behaviors of the community members). So,
I assume that Sider cannot object that the interpretation fails to satisfy the second
constraint.
The third constraint is more problematic. Recall that the sentences of the P-S
language of the form pis green(α)q are characterized by the following axiom schema.
P-S Truth Conditions: pis green(α)q is true if and only if α is green and
observed before time t or is blue and unobserved before time t
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The righthand side of this biconditional introduces many vocabulary items not
present in the original sentence. Moreover, these vocabulary items are not joint-
carving. But, both of these features are dispensable.
The speakers of the P-S language may offer a more compact statement of the
truth conditions of this sentence. Indeed, their statement of the truth conditions
for pis green(α)q may involve no vocabulary items beyond those in pα is greenq.
Disquotational P-S Truth Conditions: pis green(α)q is true if and only
if is green(α).
That is, the speakers of the P-S language may use P-S constructions in order
to characterize the truth conditions of P-S sentences. So the sentence has joint
carving vocabulary and is fully disquotational.Yet it still has the problematic truth
conditions described above.
The external constraints put pressure on my interpretation of ‘is green(Kermit)’
just in case the sentence which specifies its truth conditions fails to be structural.
But in the semantic theory under consideration, the sentence is used to specify
its own truth conditions. In other words, a challenge to my interpretation of the
P-S language antecedently presupposes that the sentences of the P-S language are
not structural. But, ‘is green(Kermit)’ is both true and contains vocabulary that
correspond to fundamental notions only. It therefore satisfies Sider’s explicit def-
initions of structural truth. For this reason, I think the best strategy for Sider is
not to argue that the existence of a language satisfying conditions I have described
is impossible, but rather to reinforce his definition of structural truth by positing
additional requirements. I now turn to strategies of this sort.
4.2. Interpreting the grammatical relations in the P-S language. The ex-
ample of the P-S language shows that sentences deploy more representational de-
vices than the vocabulary they contain. The grammatical structure of a sentence
also matters to its representational complexity. Notice that this objection exactly
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parallels Sider’s challenge to the entity-based view. He concedes that a propo-
nent of the entity-based view could insist that every expression must correspond
to a privileged entity, but argues that there must still be a representational device,
concatenation, that does not correspond to an entity. What I am arguing is that
the addition of non-entities—such as is green, is blue, and so on—does nothing to
change this dialectic. The representational device contributes to the truth condi-
tions of sentences that deploy it. But if it does not contribute an entity towards
specifying these truth conditions, then it does not contribute a nonentity either.
In reply to this challenge, Sider might take a page from Lewis’s (2000a) re-
sponse to Hawthorne (1990). Hawthorne raised Goodman-like deviant interpreta-
tions of grammatical relations to challenge Lewis’s theory of interpretation. Lewis
responded that on preferred interpretations of a language, not only the vocabu-
lary, but also the grammatical relations should be interpreted as natural. Better
interpretations of a target language ascribe a straight and not bent meaning to its
grammatical relations. Following Lewis’s lead, Sider might modify his characteri-
zation of structural truth. Instead of saying that a sentence is a structural truth
when its vocabulary corresponds to only fundamental notions, he might say that
both the vocabulary and the meaningful grammatical relations must correspond to
fundamental notions. The sentence ‘Kermit is green’ of the S-P language deploys
subject-predicate (S-P) concatenation. Sider might postulate that the S-P concate-
nation corresponds to a fundamental notion. Unlike the previous cases, he cannot
simply disquote to specify which fundamental notion. Disquoting the concatena-
tion relation leaves no expression to which to attach the fundamentality operator,
p=(. . .)q. Thus, Sider would need some expression to designate the worldly corre-
spondent of the concatenation relation. I will use ‘INST ’. A sentence of the form
pINST (α,Φ)q is true just in case α is Φ. By way of contrast, a P-S sentence such
as ‘is green(Kermit)’ deploys P-S concatenation. According to this response, even
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if P-S concatenation corresponds to a notion, it does not correspond to a funda-
mental one. Thus, the truths of the P-S language are not fundamental truths on
the revised account.
This responses exactly parallels the one that I offered on behalf entity-based
views. I suggested that proponents of this views modify their account to require
both that every expression corresponds to a privileged entity and that every gram-
matical relation do so as well. I imagined them positing a privileged relation,
instantiation, to correspond with the grammatical relation of the privileged lan-
guage. We saw that specifying the entities that correspond to the vocabulary and
grammatical relations in a sentence falls short of determining its truth conditions.
I doubt that Sider would have better luck with this strategy. The strategy
assumes that if the sentence ‘Kermit is green’ is an S-P concatenation of the
name ‘Kermit’ and the predicate ‘is green’ where S-P concatenation corresponds to
INST , ‘Kermit’ to Kermit, and ‘is green’ to is green, then the truth conditions of
the sentence must be as follows.
S-P Truth Conditions, Revised: ‘Kermit is green’ is true if and only if
INST (Kermit,is green).
But, this merely pushes the problem back a step. It introduces a new notion
INST to “glue together” Kermit with the notion is green in the specification of
the truth conditions. But, this is done by introducing a new syntactic relation
between the expressions ‘INST ’, ‘Kermit’, and ‘is green’ on the righthand side of
the biconditional. And this new syntactic relation may itself be contrasted with
deviant ones.
Consider an alternative statement of the truth conditions of the P-S language.
The proponent of this interpretation uses ‘INST ’ to state the relationship between
the subject and the predicate of a P-S concatenation. But the syntactic relationship
between ‘INST ’ and these terms is changed as follows: p(α,Φ)INSTq is true if
and only if INST (α,Φ) and α is observed before t or INST (α,is blue) and α is
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unobserved before t. The truth conditions of ‘is green(Kermit)’ can be stated as
follows.
P-S Truth Conditions, Revised: ‘is green(Kermit)’ is true if and only if
(Kermit,is green)INST .
In ‘is green(Kermit)’, the vocabulary items correspond to fundamental elements as
does the concatenation relation. But the truth conditions of this sentence still seem
deviant. The problem now is that the statement of the truth conditions makes use
of a different syntactic relation between ‘INST’, ‘Kermit’, and ‘is green’, which is
not natural.
One could require that in the statement of the truth conditions, there must also
be a fundamental notion gluing the worldly correspondent of the concatenation rela-
tion with the worldly correspondents of the vocabulary items. But, this new notion
will have to be glued by a new syntactic relation both to the worldly correspondent
of the concatenation relation and to the worldly correspondents of the vocabulary.
We are beginning to see, I think, that concatenation is a representational device
that emerges at the level of whole sentences. It is at this level that its contribution
must be assessed. One cannot, as it were, separate out its contribution to the truth
conditions of a sentence. Before I explore this possibility, I will examine one last
challenge to the P-S language.
4.3. Does vocabulary determine grammar? Occasionally, Sider (2009: §8,
especially footnote 40; 2012: §6.3) considers a variation on his view which has some
relevance to the argument from deviant grammar. To develop this variation, I
must make explicit an assumption behind the argument. I have assumed that the
basic vocabulary of a structural language would look like the vocabulary of the S-P
language, containing names such as ‘Kermit’, ‘Bunsen’, and ‘Gonzo’; predicates
such as ‘is green’ and ‘is blue’; and sentential operators such as ‘it is not the case
that’, ‘and’, and ‘or’. I have assumed that sentences of this language are formed
by concatenating this basic vocabulary. Thus, the result of S-P concatenating a
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name with a predicate is a sentence. The result of concatenating n sentences with
an n-ary sentential operator is a sentence, and so on.
Sider considers the possibility that the predicates such as ‘is green’ and ‘is blue’
are not expressions of the structural language. The sentence ‘Kermit is green’ is
not composed by concatenating ‘Kermit’ with ‘is green’. Rather, the primitive ex-
pressions are either saturated or unsaturated. The unsaturated expressions include
predicates and n-ary operators. The proper expressions of the predicates marks the
fact that they are unsaturated. Thus, the proper expression of the predicates are
‘x is green’ and ‘x is blue’ rather than ‘is green’ and ‘is blue’. The sentence ‘Kermit
is green’ is formed by replacing the “dummy variable” x with a name of the right
syntactic category. Similarly, n-ary sentential operators must have n sentence-level
dummy variables. Thus, the sentence, ‘it is not the case that Kermit is blue’ results
from replacing ‘p’ with ‘Kermit is blue’ in ‘it is not the case that p’. This approach
is reminiscent of Frege’s (1951) view of predicates as unsaturated expressions that
contain a mark of incompleteness and also of Wittgenstein’s (1921/2001) view that
an object has certain possibilities of combination in facts, and that these possibili-
ties must be reflected in the grammatical sentences in which a name for this object
can occur.
Developing this idea, the grammatical possibilities for an expression are marked
by dummy variables within the expression. Sider might argue that ‘is green(Kermit)’
is not a substitution instance of ‘x is green’ since the sentence is not syntactically
derived from this predicate. In other words, if expression E has different syntactic
possibilities in languages L and L∗, then E means different things in these two
languages. It follows that Sider has a principled reason for saying that ‘Kermit is
green’ and ‘is green(Kermit)’ contain different predicates. ‘Kermit is green’ contains
‘x is green’. ‘Is green(Kermit)’ contains ‘is green(x)’.
This approach trades one syntactic relation—concatenation—for a different rela-
tion, substitution. Unfortunately, the latter syntactic relation is liable to get up to
the same mischief as the former. Consider again the speakers of the P-S language.
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I concede that their sentences are not substitution instances of ‘x is green’ on the
grounds that they have different syntax. But this can be remedied by considering
a final stage in their linguistic development. In this final stage, they revert back
to the old syntax, but with a new meaning. That is, they go back to asserting
subject-predicate sentences, but the sentences have the meanings of the predicate-
subject ones. They assert ‘Kermit is green’, ‘Bunsen is green’, and ‘Gonzo is green’.
These sentences are true on account of the fact that the three are either green and
observed before t or blue and unobserved before t, but the deviance results from
the interpretation of the substitution relation and not the meaning of the predicate.
In the original S-P language, the substitution relation is characterized by the
following schema.
Substitution in the original S-P language: The result of substituting a
name pαq into a predicate px is Fq, pα is Fq, is true if and only if α is F .
In the revised S-P language, the substitution relation is characterized by the fol-
lowing gruesome schema.
Substitution in the revised S-P language: The result of substituting a
name pαq into a predicate px is Fq, pα is Fq, is true if and only if α is F
and is observed before t or is blue and is unobserved before t.
Once again, this statement could be made compact by simply re-using the revised
S-P language in its own semantic characterization. I assume that Sider would
want to exclude sentences of the revised S-P language from being structural truths.
The lesson is that we cannot solve the problem of deviant syntactic relations—
syntactic relations with deviant meanings—just by trading one syntactic relation,
concatenation, for another, substitution. For syntactic relations of either sort can
be given deviant interpretations.19
19Sider (2012: §11.8) revisits the issue, suggesting that a sentence such as ‘Kermit is green’ is
structural, but a sentence with the same vocabulary such as ‘is green(Kermit)’ is not on account
of the fact that the former, but not the latter, is a substitution instance of the variable for the
grammatical category of sentence, ‘p’. This proposal doesn’t seem to change the dialectic.
NAMING, SAYING, AND STRUCTURE 27
5. Sider Against Propositionalism
According to Sider, whether a truth is structural is to be explained wholly in
terms of its subsentential constituents. Sider (2012: §7.10) says his view is subpropo-
sitional. Reflecting the world’s structure is not an emergent feature of a sentence.
This is what raises the problem for Sider. For—I have argued—Sider must hold
that some truths such as ‘is green(Kermit)’ fail to be structural even though their
primitive vocabulary is joint-carving. Requiring that the grammatical relations of
this sentence be joint-carving also fails to do the job. The difficulty, we might think,
is that the truth conditions of a sentence are emergent. They cannot be specified
merely by specifying the worldly correspondents of the vocabulary and syntactic
relations.
A propositional account—an account according which appeals to distinctions at
the level of whole sentences—would avoid these problems. For instance, Kit Fine
introduces two notions—grounding and reality—which attach to whole sentences
as follows.
Fact Grounding: ‘its being the case that ... consists in nothing more than
its being the case that ...’20
Reality: ‘it is constitutive of reality that...’21
Using these two notions, Fine draws distinctions that seem very close to Sider’s
distinction between mere truths and structural truths. For instance, grounded
truths differ from fundamental grounds. A truth S is a fundamental ground, if
no sentence of the form pits being the case that S consists in nothing more than
its being the case that Φq is true. Relatedly, mere truths differ from truths that
are constitutive of reality—truths S such that pit is constitutive of reality that
Sq is true. The notions of grounding and reality are not defined in terms of the
constituents of the sentences to which they apply. As a consequence, Fine’s account
can rule that ‘it is not constitutive of reality that is green(Kermit)’, but that ‘it
20Fine (2001: 15).
21Fine (2001: 26, footnote 37).
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is constitutive of reality that Kermit is green’, even though the two truths contain
the same vocabulary.
Sider has kind words for Fine’s two options and offers what may seem at first
sight to be only esoteric criticisms of each.22 I will focus on one—Sider’s reasons
for rejecting Fine’s propositionalism—which applies to both versions of Fine’s pro-
posal.23 I believe that there is much under the surface of this criticism, and that
properly developed, it reveals that Sider’s is motivated by quite different consider-
ations from those that interest Fine.24
Sider (2012: 148) argues that Fine’s propositionalist accounts provide no expla-
nation for the combinatorial principle that I mentioned above: a truth resulting
from the arbitrary recombination of the vocabulary of a structural truth is also a
structural truth. This principle falls out of Sider’s account by definition. By way
of contrast, Fine would have to posit a primitive connection between its being con-
stitutive of reality that S and its being constitutive of reality that S′ (or between
S having a ground and S′ having a ground).
But why is Sider so keen on this combinatorial principle? As Sider is aware,
Fine’s account is not built to deliver this combinatorial result. Fine’s notion of
ground is motivated to account for certain explanatory relations, expressed by
claims that contain ‘because’ and ‘in virtue of’. And a sentence containing a cer-
tain expression might hold in virtue of another sentence containing that expression.
For instance, it is natural to say that the fact that Kermit doesn’t not love Miss
Piggy holds in virtue of the fact that he loves her. Indeed, Fine (2010: §5) hints
at an account on which atomic sentences and their negations ground more logically
complex statements, including double negations. Thus, atomic sentences and their
22Sider (2009: 403-4, footnote 40; 2012: §8.1-8.3).
23Sider directs this criticism against the account in terms of the reality operator, but the challenge
clearly applies to both.
24Sider (2012: 128) has one preliminary objection, that propositional level distinctions offend
against a natural picture of the world: “[T]here are some fundamental “building blocks” [...] and
the nature of reality is given by the arrangement of those building blocks.” But, it is Sider’s
account that offends against this picture. Sider differentiates the ultimate (fundamental) and
non-ultimate constituents of reality. But the arrangements of these constituents are given only
by the fact that names for them occur in true sentences.
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negations would be fundamental, but not double negations. A sentence such as
‘¬¬¬S’ may have the same vocabulary as structural sentence ‘¬S’ and yet fail to
be structural. So, Fine’s notion of grounding is built explicitly to allow for failures
of the combinatorial principle.
Sider’s explicit motivations for the combinatorial principle strike me as underde-
veloped, but when they are expanded, they reveal—I think—that Sider’s motivation
of discriminating good from bad languages is not on Fine’s radar. I will focus on
two, both of which are connected to Sider’s central thesis that inquiry aims at
expressing only structural truths. One consideration issues from Sider’s desire to
explain why the simplicity of ideology is a theoretical virtue. Why should we be in-
clined to accept theories that are more ideologically economical? Sider answers that
using a primitive expression requires positing additional complexity in the world,
one must suppose that there is a joint in nature corresponding to that expression.
A theorist who deploys temporal operators to express her final theory supposes that
these temporal operators are among the building blocks of reality. A theorist who
deploys a negation symbol supposes that there is a notion in the world that answers
to it. In Sider’s view, introducing negation might make a theory less parsimonious.
But, it would be misguided to count a theory as less parsimonious for containing
doubly negated claims, once the cost of negation has already been paid.25
This gives rise to a related worry about interpretation.26 Because structure pro-
vides an additional constraint on good theorizing—inquiry aims at the construction
of a theory containing only structural truths, it also provides a constraint on in-
terpretation of an alien language. A good interpretation should be as charitable
as is consistent with systematic theorizing to speakers of an alien language. So a
good interpretation should not only maximize the sentences of an alien language
interpreted as truths, but should interpret them as speaking in terms of the world’s
structure. Suppose that we are confronted by a speaker who uses an expression
25Sider’s position seems in accord with Ramsey’s (1954a: 41-42): if negation is an element of a
fact, then a truth and its double negation should state distinct facts. Of course, Sider and Ramsey
differ as to whether to apply modus ponens or modus tollens.
26Sider (2012: §8.3.4) might be taken as hinting at this worry.
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‘N ’, applying it to sentence Φ whenever Φ is not true. There is then some pressure
to think of our language user as meaning negation by ‘N ’. But it hardly counts
as evidence against this interpretation that the speaker is willing to assert “doubly
negated” claims such as ‘NNΦ’. More generally, we are hardly being uncharitable
to a speaker by interpreting her as having a uniform vocabulary item such as ‘N ’
that can freely combine with any sentence of her language.
This shows that the distinctions offered by Sider and by Fine are meant to
achieve different purposes. Sider aims to explain why inquirers who use the ‘grue’
and ‘bleen’ vocabulary are worse inquirers. Fine—and the propositionalist more
generally—has no such aims. Indeed, Fine (2009: 174) explicitly rejects the view
that one should speak only in grounded terms or in terms of what’s real.
But if I am right, the full force of the ontological claims that we
need to make can only properly be brought out by straddling both
points of view. It is only by standing outside of reality that we able
to occupy a standpoint from which the constitution of reality can
be adequately described.
Even in the course of doing metaphysics, Fine would reject the view that one should
speak only in structural terms. Rather, one should use non-structural sentences,
even if only to deny that what it says is real. This reveals, I think, that propositional
level notions are inappropriate to the task for which Sider developed the notion of
structural truth.
6. Conclusion
Where does this leave us? Sider’s basic strategy is to differentiate the structural
truths from mere truths in terms of the worldly correspondents of the representa-
tional devices that contribute to the truth. Thus, he suggests that the vocabulary
of a structural truth must correspond to fundamental notions. He also hints that
the syntactic relations must correspond to fundamental notions. But a sentence
has representational features such as its truth conditions that emerge only at the
level of whole sentences. These representational features can lead to the same sort
of deviance which motivates Sider’s account in the first place. Therefore, Sider’s
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account cannot succeed unless he appeals to features that emerge only at the level
of a sentence, and not at the level of its subpropositional features. But Sider also
aims at characterizing a privileged language—and not a privileged set of truths
within a language—that can completely describe the world. An account based on
these sentence-level notions looks ill-suited to characterizing such a language.
Related points have resurfaced periodically in the history of analytic philosophy.
Of course, my argument appeals to considerations similar to those at the heart of
Bradley’s (1893) infamous argument challenging the possibility of related things.
This may make some suspicious. Surely, the obvious fact that there are many re-
lated things should make us suspicious about the force of Bradley’s argument. But,
it is irrelevant whether the Bradley regress is sufficient to show what he intended.
For, Bradley’s argument is effective against specific packages of positions. And I
have argued that Sider endorses one such position. Moreover, I have shown that
my objection is more than fair, since Sider’s rejection of various alternatives—in
particular his rejection of entity-based views—appeals to the same considerations.
I want to mention one other instance because of its similarity to the current
dialectic. Gustav Bergmann attempted to make progress in metaphysics by investi-
gating to the representational devices needed to express a privileged and complete
description of the world. Bergmann (1960)—like Sider—recognized that since any
description of the world must be framed in terms of sentences, the syncategorematic
features of a sentence must make some metaphysical contribution. His argument,
like Sider’s, appealed to the fact that any description of the world must ultimately
make use of sentences whose terms stand in a relation. Yet, Bergmann still placed
a metaphysical premium on the vocabulary of the privileged description, arguing
that we must posit universals, since the description must contain predicates. Sel-
lars (1962) took Bergmann to task on this point, showing through his example of
‘Jumblese’ that nearly all of the vocabulary of a theory (including predicates) can
be dispensed with in favor of new syntactic rules that construct a sentence out
of a name. Views that attempt to privilege a certain description of the world in
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terms of its vocabulary only have not properly absorbed the lessons of Bradley
and of Bergmann and Sellars. The book of the world must be written in both a
vocabulary and a grammar, but it is impossible to completely disentangle these
elements.27
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